2016年1月31日 星期日

讀了顧問報告令人更擔心 - 海空安全懸念未解,三跑此刻不可填海


政府的最根本的責任是保障人民生命安全,在第三條跑道這件事上不可能例外,航空安全問題比較多人知道,不過三跑填海引申出來的海上安全問題,人命之外,還直接關乎三跑能否發揮作用。

讓我們一齊研究三跑興建前後在屯門和機場之間的海上交通情況(圖1),背景圖內的海岸線和填海界線來自201558香港政府憲報告示3319號,地政總署根據前濱及海床(填海工程)條例邀請社會對填海計劃提交意見,我們百姓才首次得知填海的確實規模。

1    赤鱲角機場填海擴建前後的海上航線比較
背景圖來自
憲報告示3319

多條航線密集的海域是著名的龍鼓水道,是進出廣州港和蛇口貨櫃碼頭的遠洋輪船包括貨櫃輪的必經之路(棕色),每天有大量運送貨物到屯門內河碼頭的內河航往來(紅色),由維港和赤鱲角海天碼頭出發前往福田、東莞、虎門和珠三角目的地的快速船也走這條水道,至於前往澳門和珠海的快速船則在機場北面經過,圖中標示D1998的三角形是保障航空安全的海上交通管制區的東北角,以上提到的船隻必須在它以北的水域經過,海面尚算遼闊。

但是三跑填海之後,海上交通管制區向北擴充,管制區東北角移到圖中標示D2023的位置,龍鼓水道可航行的海面大幅縮窄一半或以上,加上往澳門和珠海的快速船將改為向西北進入龍鼓水道(剛於1提早開始了,見註1),令狹窄的水道更為繁忙,不過還有好戲在後頭,蛇口貨櫃碼頭近年高速增長,預料貨櫃輪數目升勢強勁,再加上香港人口增長,連帶貨運內河船同步增加,多個因素疊加,龍鼓水道將擠迫不堪,明眼人都看得出海上交通意外風險水平將顯著上升

有見及此,去年7月,我根據前濱及海床(填海工程)條例,對第三條跑道的填海工程提出了正式反對(註2),11月地政總署給了書面回應,但是我拒絕撤回反對,回覆時指出:
(1)    公眾從未見過相關海上交通影響評估報告
(2)    機管局預測未來海上交通時,沒有計算內地海港如蛇口貨櫃港的快速增長
(3)   高船體的船隻對航空安全的影響未見認真處理

2016114(即是我在城市規劃委員會作供之後,希望政府不是故意令我失去在會上談海上安全話題的機會),地政總署再次發信回應,同時寄來兩份機管局的機密海上交通影響評估顧問報告,要求我考慮撤回反對,但是報告的內容令我的反對立場更堅定。

我細閱顧問報告,知道顧問採納了《環境影響評估條例》《技術備忘錄》的「指引」(註3),用來確定因三跑填海而增加的海上交通意外風險可否為社會接受,我又檢查了顧問的計算過程,發現他們錯誤理解「指引」,犯了極為嚴重的統計學錯誤(詳細解釋見註4,低估海上意外頻率達五個量級(即1/100,000),因此報告內「風險水平社會可以接受」的結論是錯誤的。

為了尋求正確答案,我採用了顧問報告內的香港海上意外統計數字和顧問推算三跑填海引起海上意外的數字,依據「指引」的套路計算,得出適用於三跑填海引起額外海上交通意外風險水平的結果(圖2),所有數據點都位於「社會不可接受」的範圍,計算過程的詳細解釋見126遞交地政總署的回覆(註4)。

2     三跑填海引起額外的海上意外風險數據點,
由紅點標記,位於「不可接受」區域

顧問報告列出了推算2030年龍鼓水道遠洋輪船數字的參考資料,可以確定他們沒有取得內地當局的預測數字,只靠香港港口數據估計,他們後來在報告中設定遠洋輪船到2030年的增長率是61-66%,但是蛇口貨櫃碼頭單是20092014的吞吐量增長率已達51%,顧問的估計顯然遠遠偏低,因此計算海上意外風險也隨之遠遠偏低。

3  第三條跑道的海上交通管制區總長度,
比現在短三分之一
翻閱顧問報告有更驚人的發現,為了保障龍鼓水道可以讓船隻航行,同時由於貼近香港西面水域邊界,第三條跑道左右碰壁,海上交通管制區的總長度比現有北跑道的管制區短三成(圖3),詳細量度後(由於文件機密,不能給大家展示細節),由跨越管制區邊界到着陸的距離兩邊都比現有北跑道短四成,後果是飛機與海上船隻位置重疊時的最低垂直距離比現時會低四成左右,大大提高了飛機與船隻互相影響(民間語言是碰撞)的概率這個嚴肅的安全問題從來沒有人提過。
管制區縮小,飛機與船隻的距離減少,意外風險增高

3還顯示了機管局和民航處一路以來小心隱藏的一個秘密,第三條跑道的海上交通管制區的西北方,由於「侵入」內地水域,硬生生切了一個角,顧問報告自己指出了問題,表示擔心會有船隻包括船桅高於30的船隻會「走捷徑」 “cutting corner” 而影響航空安全,但是因為船隻已經出了香港水域,不能想出以法律為基礎的方法去處理,於是又多了一個懸而未解的安全問題

顧問報告又指出停泊在香港水域以西的「大嶼山2錨區」(見圖3的船隻(及海上建構物如鑽油台)可能影響在三跑升降的飛機安全(註5),不過任務由另一顧問負責,據說報告完成後會通報深圳海上安全當局,再由港深兩地政府跟進溝通協商解決問題,但是至今公眾從未見過這份報告,也從未聽聞港深兩地有任何溝通,這方面的安全問題也是懸而未解,由於涉及香港和深圳兩地政府,恐怕會發展成高鐵一地兩檢的不幸翻版

基於以上觀察,三跑的海空安全充滿未解之懸念,在人民生命安全未能保障的情況下,我別無選擇,必須向地政總署重申反對有關填海,並且強烈要求地政總署,為了公眾安全,必須立即履行盡職檢查 due diligence,委聘中立和有崇高地位的統計學家複核顧問評估海上安全風險的計算,在這個步驟完成之前不可以批准填海,否則有違良好管治 good governance 原則。

除此之外,海上交通影響評估報告低估遠洋輪船帶來的風險,海上交通管制區太短增加飛機和船隻碰撞的風險從來沒有評估,西北角船隻走捷徑的風險和大嶼山2號錨區的風險和跨境協商的解決毫無眉目,以上幾條都是待決的海空安全懸念,人命關天,不是一句「經濟發展第一」就可以抹煞的,謹以至誠忠告政府,為政必以人民的生命為第一,捨此再無立足之處。


1     明報  2016117  「衝向中華白海豚 – 機管局的蠻幹亂幹」
2     網誌《草雲居》  201576  「保障海上安全,反對為興建第三條跑道的填海」
3     《環境影響評估條例》《技術備忘錄》第12章及附件4
4     網誌《草雲居》  2016130日  「向地政總署遞交重申反對三跑填海的信函(1月26)」
5     《草雲居》  2015年4月4日  「你不知道的三跑秘密:飛機撞鑽油臺和貨櫃輪的風險」

2016年1月30日 星期六

向地政總署遞交重申反對三跑填海的信函(1月26)


去年7月,根據前濱及海床(填海工程)條例第6節,我對第三條跑道的填海工程提出了正式反對(註1),主要論據是填海後機場的海上交通管制區大幅擴充,龍鼓水道的可航行海面大幅縮窄,增加該處的海上安全風険,11月地政總署給了回應,但是我拒絕撤回反對,原因有三:

(1)    公眾從未見過相關海上交通影響評估報告
(2)    機管局預測未來海上交通時,沒有計算內地海港如蛇口貨櫃港的快速增長
(3)    高船體的船隻對航空安全的影響未有處理(參考註2

2016114地政總署再次來信解釋和寄來兩份機管局的機密海上交通影響評估顧問報告,要求我考慮撤回反對,但是詳讀報告後,報告的內容更堅定了我的反對立場,126再回覆地政總署拒絕撤回反對,指出多處嚴重海空安全風險未有解決,以及要求委聘中立和有崇高地位的統計學家複核顧問的風險計算。

遞交地政總署的文件全文見下,部份圖因為地政總署把顧問報告列為機密文件,所以加以覆蓋,以表尊重。



      *          *          *          *

Objection Number: LD3RS2
TO:  District Lands Office, Islands
        Lands Department
        19/F, Harbour Building,
        38 Pier Road, Central, Hong Kong
        Email  leissd@landsd.gov.hk

G.N. 3319
FORESHORE AND SEA-BED (RECLAMATIONS) ORDINANCE (Chapter 127)
(Notification under Section 5)

Expansion of Hong Kong International Airport into a Three-runway System

1.          I refer to your letter dated 14 January 2016 (your reference: (7) in LD DLO/IS FSRO/3RS/02).  I appreciate the explanations given in the Annex to the letter and the copies of consultant reports attached.  Those reports have enabled me to understand much better the technical issues involved, which has strengthened my position in objecting to the reclamation.

2.          I maintain the objection I submitted on 6 July 2015 and my Further Comments submitted on 22 November 2015.  The reasons are elaborated below.

Original Objection
3.          The key point of my original objection dated 6 August 2015 isincreased risk of maritime accidents and consequently that of marine pollution.  The increased risk is indeed confirmed by chapter 8 “2030 Benchmark Year Marine Traffic Collision Risk Modelling Results” of Marine Traffic Impact Assessment Report Final Study Report March 2015 (“MTIA Report” or “the Report”).  On page 82, it specifically recognizes that the Three-runway Project would increase the number of maritime collisions by 1 per year.
   
4.          In section 8.7 “Risk Acceptability”, the consultant’s conclusion that the increased risk was acceptable was based on a “clear and unambiguous guideline on risk acceptability” (p.83) spelt out in chapter 12 “Hazard Assessment” of the EIA Ordinance Technical Memorandum (EIAO TM) and the associated Annex 4“Criteria for Evaluating Air Quality Impact and Hazard to Life” (full text given in Appendix 1).  On detailed examination of the Report, it is revealed that the consultant has made a serious, fundamental mistake in the application of the guideline.

5.          The original figure in EIAO TM (fig.1) and the figure presented by the consultant on p.84 (fig. 2) are shown side by side below.  According to EIAO TM, the scale on the left-hand side is the frequency (F) of accidents with N or more fatalities per year.  It refers to the number of accidents (“collisions” in the present case).  It has nothing to do with any number related to the population.  But in the Report, the label was simplified to “frequency per year” in the Report and the value of “frequency” was derived by an un-orthodox algorithm.  As will be explained later, the data points plotted in the lower left-hand corner of fig.2 were incorrectly placed and sere indeed wrong by a wide margin of several orders of magnitude.

Fig. 1 EIAO TM figure

 Fig. 2 MTIA Report figure

 6.          According to pp. 83-84 of the Report, out of all HKSAR maritime collisions
              a.    1 fatality occurred in 0.3% of collisions
b.    2 fatalities occurred in 0.1% of collisions
c.    3-10 fatalities occurred in 0.1% of collisions
d.    10-50 fatalities occurred in 0.1% of collisions

7.          Expressed in terms of N fatalities or more:
a.    N=1 in 0.6% of collisions
b.    N=2 in 0.3% of collisions
c.    N=3 in 0.2% of collisions
d.    N=10 in 0.1% of collisions

8.          The Three-runway Project is responsible for increasing the number of collisions by 1 per year (see paragraph 3).  Combined with the probability figures in paragraph 7, the frequencies of collisions per year corresponding to the various numbers of fatalities arising from the Three-runway Project are:
a.     F=0.6%=6 x 10-3  for N=1
b.     F=0.3%=3 x 10-3  for N=2
c.     F=0.2%=2 x 10-3  for N=3
d.     F=0.1%=1 x 10-3  for N=10

9.          In the Report, on p. 84, the consultant wrongly adopted “37.1 collisions” in assessing the acceptability of risk arising from the Project.  But an even worse and fundamental mistake was made when the consultant divided the frequency figures by a totally irrelevant figure of 12 million (the number of people transiting the Focus Area aboard vessels).  Their pretext is “to create the risk profile of the fatality potential”, which is an un-defined phrase carrying no established sense.  It is merely a jargon to frighten off non-mathematicians and non-statisticians.  By introducing the irrelevant denominator, the end result is that the derived figures are NOT what the clearly defined term “frequency of accidents” means.  If not for the wrong adoption of “37.1”, the derived figures would have been SIX ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE OFF.

10.      Following the correct approach explained in paragraphs 6-8, the correct positions of the data points plotted in the official figure in EIAO TM Annex 4 Societal Risk Guidelines for Acceptable Levels are shown in fig. 3 (next page). 

11.      It is abundantly clear from fig. 3 that the additional risk arising from the Three-runway System falls within the “UNACCEPTABLE” zone.  This confirms the concern which I expressed in my original submission dated 6 August 2015.  Since my concern has been validated by the consultant’s own data and the criterion it has adopted viz. EIAO TM Societal Risk Guidelines, I am therefore in no position to withdraw my original objection to the reclamation associated with the Three-runway System.

Fig. 3 Additional risk arising from the Three-runway System

Further Comment No. 1
12.      My “Further Comment No. 1” dated 22 November 2015 is also validated because only with the information available in the MTIA Report is it possible to discover that the consultant has made a gross mistake in the assessment of the acceptability of additional risk to maritime safety arising from the Three-runway System.

Further Comment No. 2
13.      With regard to Further Comment No. 2, it is observed that p. 48 of MTIA Report made no reference to any Chinese source on the projected growth in ocean-going traffic from Chinese Mainland ports upstream in the Pearl River estuary, in particular the Shekou Container Terminals (SCT).  In Table 3.3 “Summary of Stochastic Forecast Increases (2013 to 2030)”, under “Ocean Going”, the “Upper Bound” and “Lower Bound” were set at 66% and 61% respectively.  But as stated in my original submission, the traffic volume of SCT increased by 51% between 2009 and 2014 alone.  The consultant’s figures were therefore most likely a significant underestimate

14.      Furthermore, because goods carried by these ocean-going vessels in transit through Hong Kong waters are not captured by Hong Kong Port statistics, no Hong Kong data source can remedy this shortcoming.  The failure of the consultant to obtain reliable data from the Mainland side rendered its projection for Ocean Going vessels invalid, and consequently, its simulations and risk assessments invalid.  Therefore my Further Comment No. 2 stands even more strongly with additional information from the MTIA Report.

Further Comment No. 3
15.      With regard to Further Comment No. 3 which concerns the mutual interference between maritime safety and aviation safety, MTIA Reports affords me an opportunity to examine closely the setting up of the HKIA Approach Areas (HKIAAA), which as you have mentioned in your letter dated 14 January 2016, “is an area established in the vicinity of the airport island to safeguard flight safety”.  Fig.4 shows fig. 2.3 from MTIA Report, with the addition of four measurements of the distance between runway thresholds and the corresponding HKIAAA boundary segments.

Fig. 4  HKIAAA relative to northern and middle runways.
The four marked segments indicate the distance between the
runway thresholds and the corresponding HKIAAA boundary segments

16.      The “safeguard” distances for the northern runway are 2.1 kmon both the eastern and western sides.  They are correspondingly only 62% and 58% of their counterparts on the middle runway.  The eastern extent of the HKIAAA for the northern runway has been curtailed in order to avoid breaching marine safety in Urmston Road.   On the western side, it was clearly limited by the Hong Kong– Mainland border. 

17.      Maritime safety has been nominally ensured by the HKIAAA delineation shown in fig. 2.3 of MTIA Report, allowing high airdraft vessels to travel on Urmston Road.  However, it has been achieved by sacrificing the “safeguard” distances for the northern runway.  It means that the altitude of aircraft on crossing the boundary of HKIAAA when using the northern runway will be about 40% lower than when using the middle runway, on the basis of the shortened safeguard distances.  This obviously lowers aviation safety level of aircraft landing and taking off from the northern runway arising from interactions with marine transport underneath the flight path near HKIAAA boundary.

18.      This critical safety issue has not been addressed by any report published by the Airport Authority so far.  In the absence of any conscious effort by the due authority to quantify the additional risk due to the shortened safeguard distances, it is premature to conclude that the increased risk of aviation accidents is within acceptable levels.  Therefore my Further Comment No. 3 stands even more strongly with information available in the MTIA Report.

Additional Observations
19.      The north-western corner of HKIAAA is artificially cut(see fig. 4 above) owing to the limitation of the Hong Kong – Mainland border.  It has negative impact on aviation safety.  The consultant recognized this issue in section 5.4 on p. 66 of MTIA Report.  The Report indeed recognized that derrick lighters with airdraft exceeding 30 metres would cross the area about once a day.  But the consultant was unable to offer any means to ensure that no vessel with such airdraft would cut corners and infringe aviation safety at this sensitive area (section 10.2.3, p. 95-98).  The consultant has merely left it as “subject to further study and under Environment Permits Conditions” (p. 98).  Thus this remains an unresolved safety issue.  The reclamation cannot go ahead with such critical safety issue hanging in the air.

20.      The MTIA Report explicitly said that it did not cover marine traffic impact “relating to Mainland Anchorages (Lantau Island No. 2 Anchorage and Anchorage No. 23 DY) and Airdraft” (p. 7).  It said that a separate report on this subject would be completed in 2014 and issued to Shenzhen Maritime Safety Administration for consultation.  It is understood thatcertain structures with tall airdraft (related to the petroleum industry) anchored in Lantau Island No. 2Anchorage would infringe the safety envelope of aircraft landing on the northern runway from the westand that coordination with Shenzhen authorities is required to resolve this aviation safety issue.  So far, the public has no access to any information on this subject or any information on relevant Hong Kong – Shenzhen consultations.  Therefore this remains an open question with no guarantee of success in the resolution of the maritime-aviation safety issue.  This being the case, there is no guarantee that aircraft can land safely on the northern runway from the west, which means that the purpose for which it is built cannot be realized.  In view of this, the reclamation cannot go ahead.

Conclusion
21.      My objection to the proposed reclamation under the Foreshore and Sea-bed (Reclamations) Ordinance (Chapter 127) continues to stand, together with the three Further Comments.

22.      My objection is firmly based on:
a.       Unacceptable societal risk which has been validated by MTIA Report data
b.       Gross mistake in the consultant’s assessment of acceptability of accidents with fatalities
c.       Failure of MTIA Report to factor in growth in ocean-going traffic based on reliable Chinese sources and significant underestimate compared with information from Shekkou Container Terminals
d.      Aviation safety in relation to the northern runway has been compromised after priority being given to maritime safety, to an extent not yet quantified properly
e.       Aviation safety issue associated with the north-western corner of HKIAAA which has remained unresolved
f.       Open question about maritime-aviation safety issue associated with Lantau Island Anchorage No. 2, which requires Hong Kong – Shenzhen consultation and coordination, of which no evidence has been presented to date.

23.      I strongly urge you as a matter of due diligence to engage a neutral expert of high standing in statistics, with no vested interest in the Three-runway System, to examine critically the assessment done by the Consultant of the acceptability of additional risks arising from the Three-runway System, in particular the contents of section 8.7 of MTIA Report.  Before this is done, presenting the proposed reclamation to Executive Council would not be good governance and is subject to judicial review.

24.      I sincerely hope that you would treat SAFETY as top priority in dealing with this matter.  Economic consideration must not interfere with your decision.

     *          *          *          *
Appendix 1

Environmental Impact Assessment Ordinance
Technical Memorandum

12. HAZARD ASSESSMENT

12.1 Hazard Assessment (HA) shall be conducted for projects if, and only if, risk to life is a key issue with respect to Hong Kong Government Risk Guidelines. Reference shall also be made to Section 4.4.3 (a) (i) in so far as risk to life is concerned. The need for a HA and its technical requirements and procedures shall be considered by the Director subject to the advice of the authorities stated in Annex 22. The Risk Guidelines are set out in Annex 4 and Figure 1.
__________________________________________________

ANNEX 4 : CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING AIR QUALITY IMPACT AND HAZARD TO LIFE 
1. Air Quality Impact
1.1 The criteria for evaluating air quality impact include the following:
a.                   meet the Air Quality Objectives and other standards established under the Air Pollution Control Ordinance;
b.                  meet hourly Total Suspended Particulate concentration of 500 microgrammes per cubic metre measured at 298K (25C) and 101.325 kPa (one atmosphere) for construction dust impact assessment;
c.                   meet 5 odour units based on an averaging time of 5 seconds for odour prediction assessment;
d.                  for air pollutants not established under the Air Pollution Control Ordinance nor above: meet the standards or criteria adopted by recognized international organizations such as WHO or USEPA as to be agreed with the Director of Environmental Protection.
2. Hazard to Life
2.1 The criterion for hazard to human life is to meet the Risk Guidelines, as shown in Figure 1.




END